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1. Introduscction
1.1 Overview
At the core of the pivotal voter model is the idea that voters respond to the likelihood that
their vote will matter for the collective decision, i.e., that they will be pivotal. This canonical
model has many important implications. If participation is at all costly (be it due to travel
costs involved in getting to the booth for political voters, time costs for faculty invited to
a recruiting meeting, etc.), greater turnout is to be expected when the likelihood of a close
decision is higher. Furthermore, information regarding the distribution of preferences, such as
the fraction of the population that supports one alternative relative to another, would induce
those in the minority to participate at greater rates. Consequently, any such information,
which is commonly dispelled through polls, would have detrimental welfare effects. It would
induce more costly participation and make the majority-preferred alternative less likely to
be selected.
Large political elections provide a rather challenging case for the underlying premise of
the pivotal voter model. Indeed, probabilities of pivotality are perceived to be pervasively
low — for example, Mulligan and Hunter (2003) estimate that approximately one of every
100,000 votes cast in U.S. Congressional elections, and one of every 15,000 votes cast in state
legislator elections, ‘mattered’ in that they were cast for a candidate that tied or won the
election by precisely one vote. Nonetheless, the value of participation in political elections
is hard to assess, and the pivotal voter model could still provide useful guidance in terms of
the effects of information on outcomes, the behavior of individuals in small groups making
collective decisions in which pivot probabilities are substantial, etc.
The current paper describes an array of experiments that focus on the explicit link
between voters’ beliefs and their participation decisions. These are some of the first ex-
periments to elicit beliefs directly in a variety of informational settings.1 In particular, we
consider the impact of information revealed through polls and the welfare consequences they
1See the literature review below for exceptions.
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entail. Our design consequently contributes to the understanding of how individuals report
their intentions in polls as well.
In detail, 22 groups of 9 subjects each participated in a total of 440 elections between
two alternatives. Subjects had to choose one of two colors: Red or Blue, using majority rule.
At the outset of each election, one of two jars was selected at random — a “red” or a “blue”
jar. The red jar contained two red balls and one blue ball and the blue jar contained two
blue balls and one red ball. Each of the nine subjects in a group received an independent
draw (with replacement) from the selected jar. The color of the drawn ball represented the
subject’s preferred alternative (and, therefore, the chosen jar captured the distribution of
preferences). Ultimately, each subject had to decide whether to cast a costly vote for either
Red or Blue, or whether to abstain.
We considered three treatments. In all treatments subjects knew their own preferred
color. In our baseline No Polls treatment, subjects were provided with no further informa-
tion. In the Perfect Polls treatment, subjects were also informed of the selected jar. In
particular, subjects knew the alternative likely to be supported by a majority. In the Lab
Polls treatment, subjects participated in a poll reporting their voting intentions and were
told the results of that poll before deciding whether to cast a vote or abstain. In all groups,
subjects were asked to predict the group preference composition and ultimate voting profile
prior to voting, i.e. report their beliefs regarding the outcome of the election.
While we use the terminology of political elections, thinking of subjects as voters, our
experimental setup can be thought off as a metaphor for a wide variety of settings, includ-
ing investment decisions by corporate strategy committees, hiring and tenure decisions by
university faculty, and so on.
The experimental data reveal several interesting insights. First, the propensity to vote
increases systematically with experimental subjects’ predictions of their preferred color’s
advantage — the more likely they thought their preferred color was to win, the more likely
they were to vote. With regards to the pivotal voter model, turnout rates are significantly
higher for elections that are predicted to be close relative to all others aggregated together.
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However, our design allows for a more refined look into the response of turnout to beliefs. It
reveals a monotonic pattern that is not in line with the pivotal voter model — elections that
are predicted to yield a victory to the preferred alternative induce greater participation.
Second, the information regarding the preference distribution in the population does not
have a detrimental effect on welfare as theory would predict. In fact, all of our treatments
yield comparable welfare levels. From a policy perspective, this suggests that dispelling in-
formation in the electorate would not be as harmful as our standard theoretical framework
would suggest. Furthermore, while the pivotal voter model would imply that polls, sug-
gestive of which alternative is supported by a majority of the population, would induce
minority supporters to turn out more and therefore lead to closer elections, in our experi-
ments landslide elections are significantly more common when more information is available
to the electorate.
Last, our design allows us to inspect the behavior of subjects in polls. In our experimental
polls, very few subjects mis-report the alternative they will vote for. However, there is
substantial discrepancy between declared intentions to participate and ultimate turnout
decisions. Pre-election polls consistently overestimate voter turnout.2 In our experiments,
82% of subjects reported that they will vote, while in fact no more than 50% actually voted
(and, of those reporting they will vote, only 42% ultimately participated). The patterns
of ultimate participation shed light on some of the empirical observations regarding polls.
Namely, the literature has been inconclusive on whether polls lead to Bandwagon Effects,
making poll winners win with even greater leads than predicted, or Underdog Effects, leading
poll winners to lose votes in the actual election. Our results illustrate that which effect
prevails depends on the margins of victory elicited by the polls. When poll victories are
small, Bandwagon Effects appear, while when polls predict a landslide victory for one of the
alternatives, Underdog Effects are observed.
2This phenomenon has been diagnosed in a variety of polling environments. For instance, the American
National Election Study (ANES) is prone to exaggerated reported intentions to turn out (see Holbrook and
Krosnick, 2010 and references therein).
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1.2 Related Literatuscre
The crux of the pivotal voter model is the observation that a vote matters only when it
is pivotal. When preferences are private, the pivotal voter model translates into a simple
cost-benefit analysis. A voter needs to contemplate the probability that her vote determines
the election (the benefit) and weigh it against the cost of participation. Suppose two alter-
natives are being considered. In a model in which all voters experience the same distribution
of participation costs, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) and Borgers (2004), majority sup-
porters will participate less than minority supporters, and overall participation will decline
with participation costs.3
Some of the theoretical predictions of the pivotal voter model have been observed in the
lab. Levine and Palfrey (2007) directly tested the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) model and
found confirmation for the main comparative statics predicted by the model. For example,
Levine and Palfrey document that participation declines with participation costs. This result
has also been documented by Cason and Mui (2005) and Kartal (2012) in slightly different
settings. Nonetheless, most experimental studies find that majority supporters vote with
greater propensities than minority ones (see Duffy and Tavits, 2008, Großer and Schram,
2010, and Kartal, 2012), contrasting the predictions of the pivotal voter model.4
When the distribution of preferences is commonly known, the most efficient outcome (cor-
responding to the majority-preferred alternative when payoffs are symmetric) can be deduced
absent an election. The recent literature has therefore suggested that it is uncertainty over
preferences in the electorate that make elections an important collective decision instrument.
Goeree and Großer (2007) and Taylor and Yildrim (2010) consider models in which there is
uncertainty over who is the majority-preferred candidate. Absent any information, individ-
3When there is uncertainty over which alternative is superior,a strategic agent also considers the infor-
mation contained in the event of being pivotal, taking into account others’strategies (see Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1996; Myerson, 1998; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997, 1998).
4The only experimental paper reporting greater minority support is Levine and Palfrey (2007). However,
the differences in observed participation rates in this setup are rather small: when the size of the electorate
is 9, majority supporters vote at a rate of 40% or 45%, while minority supporters vote at a rate of 44% or
48%, depending on the relative volume of minority supporters.
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uals cannot condition their participation on whether or not they are majority supporters.
Participation rates are therefore comparable across the minority and majority camps and
the majority-preferred candidate is likely to be chosen. In such elections, polls may play an
important role, as they provide information to voters regarding their likelihood of belonging
to the majority. Information regarding the distribution of preferences may induce minority
supporters to vote more since their likelihood to affect election outcomes is higher. There-
fore, polls may lead to more participation, and lower likelihood of the majority-preferred
candidate to be selected. Consequently, polls have a negative welfare effect.5
Several papers have considered the impact of information on preferences in the lab.
Duffy and Tavits (2008) observe a positive association between predicted closeness of an
election and participation rates. Großer and Schram (2010) and Klor and Winter (2006)
consider experimental polls that reveal the precise distribution of preferences in the electorate
(effectively mimicking the Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983, setting). They find that polls by and
large increase turnout and have welfare effects that depend on how equally divided support is.
When there are unequal levels of support, polls have non-negative welfare effects. However,
in closely divided electorates, polls have detrimental effects on welfare.6 ,7
As a summary, we note that the experiments described in this paper provide three impor-
tant methodological innovations. First, we elicit subjects’ beliefs regarding election outcomes
prior to their choices, information that is particularly challenging to gather from field data.
This allows us to test the pivotal voter model in a direct manner. Second, we consider
polls that take place in the lab and can therefore inspect behavior in the poll as well as in
5The effects of polls in information aggregation settings is analyzed in Coughlan (2000). The effects of
free-form communication preceding elections, with either private information or private preferences, appears
in Gerardi and Yariv (2007).
6There is also an experimental literature considering different forms of communication preceding elections
in which participation is free, but individuals have private information regarding the ‘quality’ of either of the
two candidates; See Goeree and Yariv (2011), Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), and references
therein. Sinclair and Plott (2010) consider experimental spatial elections in which candidates’ locations are
uncertain and observe how polls allow subjects to ultimately behave as if they are informed.
7For a general review of political economy experiments, see Palfrey (2006). There is also some empirical
work investigating the predictions of the pivotal voter model regarding turnout in small-scale elections.
Coate and Conlin (2004) and Coate, Conlin and Moro (2008) use data from the Texas liquor referenda and
illustrate the limited guidance the pivotal voter model provides in predicting outcomes.
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response to its results.8 Last, all of our settings entail some uncertainty over which alterna-
tive is favored by the majority, environments in which collective decision protocols may be
particularly important.
1.3 Paper Struscctuscre
Section 2 describes the experimental design. The corresponding theoretical predictions
are analyzed in Section 3. We start the description of the experimental observations in Section
4 in which we report the prevalence of landslide elections and the welfare consequences as they
interact with election information. The voting behavior, in terms of turnout and response to
information is described in Section 5. The analysis of the reports in the experimental polls
and their effects on ultimate outcomes appears in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. Experimental Design
We use a sequence of experiments to assess voters’ response to information and beliefs re-
garding the underlying distribution of preferences.9 There is a “red” jar and a “blue” jar:
the red jar contains two red balls and one blue ball and the blue jar contains two blue
balls and one red ball. We use the color of the jar as a metaphor for the inclination of the
decision-making group (a committee, an electorate) toward one of two alternatives that are
being considered (an investment opportunity, a political candidate). At the start of each
session, subjects are randomized into a group of nine subjects.10 The timing of each of our
sessions was as follows:
States and Preferences. At the start of each of 20 periods, one of the jars is chosen by a
toss of a fair coin. In each period, after the jar had been selected, each of the nine subjects
8There exists a large empirical literature in Political Science that investigates how polls influence voters’
behavior. One of the problematic aspects of most of the field studies on this topic is the necessity to
disentangle whether polls affect preferences, or change voters’ propensity to vote. Our experiments provide
a clean separation between these two channels, since voter preferences are fixed.
9The full instructions we used are available at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~lyariv/Research.htm
10We kept subjects in the same group throughout each session in order to avoid potential ‘contamination’
across groups and since repeated game effects seemed particularly difficult in this setting. In fact, subjects
did not seem to exhibit any group-dependent intertemporal correlation in behavior, as we show in Section
5.3.
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in a group receives an independent draw (with replacement) from the selected jar. The color
of the drawn ball matches the jar’s color with probability p = 2/3. Ultimately, each group
of subjects chooses an alternative — red or blue. The individual color each subject draws
corresponds to the subject’s preferred alternative.
Polls. Depending on the treatment, subjects were provided some information on the realized
jar. Specifically, we had three types of sessions:
No Polls Subjects know that each jar had a 50 − 50 probability of being selected, but
observe no information on the realized jar other than their private draw.
Perfect Polls Subjects are perfectly informed of the realized jar in each period. This
corresponds to a situation in which agents’ preferences are polled perfectly so that the
distribution of preferences in the population is transparent to all.11
Lab Polls After private draws (i.e., preferences) for a period are revealed, subjects are
asked to declare their intended actions: abstain, vote for red, or vote for blue. The
resulting overall statistics (number of subjects intending to abstain, vote for red, and
vote for blue) are then reported to subjects. This treatment replicates real polls in
which subjects may potentially be strategic when responding to the polls and not
necessarily report their actual intended actions.
Beliefs. After receiving information regarding the realized jar as determined by one of the
three treatments, subjects are asked to report their beliefs regarding the composition of the
group (number of subjects preferring red and number of subjects preferring blue), as well
as the distribution of votes (for red and blue).12 At the end of the experiment, one of these
guesses was randomly chosen for each subject and the subject was paid a $10 bonus for that
guess being correct.
11For example, if the color of the realized jar was blue, then each subject knows that each member of the
group has a 2/3 chance of drawing a blue ball and a 1/3 chance of drawing a red ball.
12Subjects’ guesses regarding group composition had to specify two numbers summing up to 9. Their
guesses regarding the vote distribution did not have to comply with that restriction, due to the possibility
of some subjects ultimately abstaining.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Decisions and Payoffs. After subjects report their beliefs, each decides whether to abstain,
vote red, or vote blue. Voting (for either red or blue) entails a cost of either 25 cents or 50
cents.13 Once all decisions are received, each group’s votes are tallied and the alternative
receiving the majority of votes is selected (ties broken randomly). Each subject for whom the
color of the private draw coincides with the selected alternative receives $2 for that period,
while others receive no additional payments. The resulting per-period payoff is a reward
corresponding to the selected alternative ($0 or $2) minus any cost incurred by voting.
To summarize, the experiments employ a 3×2 design based on variations in the informa-
tion available to voters regarding the underlying distribution of preferences and the voting
participation costs. Each experimental session implemented one of the information treat-
ments (No Polls, Perfect Polls, or Lab Polls). Within most sessions, the initial 10 periods
have costs set at 50 cents and are followed by 10 periods in which participation costs are set
at 25 cents.14 In order to check for order effects, we ran several sessions in each information
treatment with the order of costs reversed (namely, in two groups corresponding to the No
Polls treatment and in three groups corresponding to each of the Perfect Polls and Lab Polls
treatments). These “reverse order” sessions led to qualitatively identical insights as our
baseline treatments. In order to keep the discussion focused, we report results aggregated
across all sessions.15
13These costs were common and known to all subjects in the beginning of the round.
14Notice that the size of the bonus is sufficiently small as to make group behavior aimed at achieving the
bonus particularly costly. In fact, while subjects had an accurate general perception of outcomes, their rates
of correct guesses were very low, always lower than 10%. We return to this point in Section 5.3.
15Separate analysis of the sessions in which rounds with voting costs of 25 cents preceded the rounds with
voting costs of 50 cents is available from the authors upon request.
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The experiments were conducted at the California Social Sciences Experimental Lab-
oratory (CASSEL) at UCLA. Overall, 198 subjects participated. The average payoff per
subject in the No Polls treatment was $29.4, the average payoff per subject in the Perfect
Polls treatment was $31.9, while the corresponding average in the Lab Polls treatment was
$30.1.16 In addition, each subject received a $5 show-up fee. Table 1 summarizes the details
of our design.
3. Theoretical Predictions
Our experimental design is in line with the model proposed by Goeree and Großer (2007).
Formally, consider a group of n ≥ 2 individuals (subjects, committee members, political
voters, etc.) who collectively choose one of two alternatives, {red, blue}. This can be under-
stood as a metaphor for a choice between two political candidates, investment alternatives,
etc. Each individual experiences a cost c > 0 if she participates and 0 otherwise. The chosen
alternative is determined using simple majority rule among the votes cast by all individu-
als who participated, where a tie leads to a random draw of one of the alternatives. An
individual’s utility is V if her preferred alternative wins and 0 otherwise.
At the outset, a state of nature is chosen randomly from {R,B} (experimentally cor-
responding to a red or blue jar; metaphorically, to a state in which one candidate is more
popular than another). Both states are a-priori equally likely. If the state is R, each indi-
vidual receives an r ‘badge’ with probability p ≥ 1/2 and a b badge with probability 1− p.
Similarly, when the state is B, each individual receives a b badge with probability p and an r
badge with probability 1− p. An individual receiving an r badge prefers the alternative red
(and receives no utility from the alternative blue being selected), while an individual with a
b badge prefers the state blue.
The main parameter for this study is how much agents know about the selected state:
without polls, only the prior; with perfect polls, the realized state; with lab polls, a noisy
statistic about the realized state.
16These numbers correspond to the sum of the 20 period payoffs and the potential $10 bonus payment for
reporting a correct belief in the (randomly) chosen period and question.
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3.1. No Access to Polls. When agents are uninformed of the realized state, all are
ex-ante symmetric. We focus on symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. Since c > 0 and there
are only two alternatives, whenever agents participate, they vote for their most preferred
candidate.
Denote by Ppiv(k) the probability that an agent is pivotal when k other agents participate.
If no other agent participates, an individual is certainly pivotal: Ppiv(0) = 1. When one
other agent participates, the individual is pivotal only when the other agent has opposing
preferences, Ppiv(1) = 1/2. For any j = 1, ..., ⌊(n− 1) /2⌋ ,
17
Ppiv(2j) =
(
2j
j
)
pj(1− p)j and Ppiv(2j + 1) =
(
2j + 2
j + 1
)
pj+1(1− p)j+1.
Notice that an agent is pivotal either when a vote by her would create a tie (avoiding
her preferred alternative being defeated), or by breaking a tie (and leading her preferred
alternative to be selected). Since a tie is associated with a 50−50 chance of either alternative
being selected, the expected benefit from voting when pivotal is V/2.
Whenever c > V/2, costs outweigh the maximal possible benefit of voting and the unique
symmetric equilibrium has no agent participating.
Whenever c ≤ Ppiv(n − 1) ∗ V/2, the benefits of voting outweigh the costs even when
all other agents participate for sure. In that case, the unique symmetric equilibrium would
entail full participation.
For intermediate costs, symmetric equilibria involve agents mixing between voting and
abstaining. Indifference between the two implies that the value of voting precisely equals
its cost c. The more likely are others to vote, the higher are the incentives to free-ride and
abstain. The following proposition characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium in our
setting:
Proposition 1 (No Polls — Equilibrium Participation) For participation costs c ∈
(Ppiv(n− 1) ∗ V/2, V/2), in the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, all agents
17⌊x⌋ denotes the greatest integer k such that k ≤ x.
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participate with probability γ∗(n, p, c) ∈ (0, 1) given by:
V
2
∗
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
(γ∗(n, p, c))k (1− γ∗(n, p, c))n−1−k Ppiv(k) = c
and all those participating vote sincerely for their preferred alternative. Furthermore,
γ∗(n, p, c) is decreasing in c.
In our experiments, V = $2, we consider n = 9, p = 2/3, and participation costs that are
c = 25 or c = 50 cents. The left panel of Table 2 contains the resulting equilibrium voting
probabilities. In addition, Table 2 reports the resulting expected participation costs (for the
group) and the resulting expected collective welfare, calculated as the difference between the
overall expected rewards for individuals and the costs incurred by the group.
3.2. Introducing Polls. We consider polls that reveal to the electorate the underlying
distribution of preferences, i.e., all individuals know precisely which state R or B prevails
(Perfect Polls treatment).
As before, when costs are sufficiently low, all agents participate, while when costs are
high enough, no agents participate. For intermediate costs, at least some of the agents,
depending on their preferences, will participate with some probability.
Suppose, for instance, that the realized state is B. Focusing on intermediate costs, we
consider quasi-symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. These are equilibria in which all agents
who share a preferred alternative (red or blue) use the same strategy. Since blue is the
a-priori majority preference, the pivotality conditions now need to be spelled out for each
‘type’ of individual, one who prefers red or one who prefers blue, separately. In order for
the text of this paper to remain focused, we do not spell out the pivotality conditions that
arise. The following proposition characterizes the unique quasi-symmetric equilibrium (in
which all individuals who prefer the same alternative use the same strategy), assuming the
realized state is B.
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Table 2: Theoretical Predictions
Proposition 2 (Perfect Polls — Equilibrium Participation) For participation costs
c ∈ (Ppiv(n− 1) ∗ V/2, V/2), in the unique quasi-symmetric Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium, the participation probabilities for those preferring B and R are given by γ∗B =
γ∗(n, c, 1
2
)/(2p) and γ∗R = γ
∗(n, c, 1
2
)/(2(1 − p)) when c ≥ ccrit(p), while (1 − p)/p <
γ∗B ≤ 1 and γ
∗
R = 1 when c < ccrit(p), where
ccrit(p) =
n−1∑
l=0
(
n− 1
l
)(
l
⌊l/2⌋
)
(1− p)l(2p− 1)n−l−1.
A few notes are in order. First, if all agents vote with some probability, notice that the
majority voters, those who prefer blue, should vote with lower probability than the minority
voters. Indeed, for all agents the cost of participation is given by c. In equilibrium, all agents
must equate the value of participating with its cost. Since the size of the majority is, by
definition, greater than that of the minority, it must be that minority voters participate with
greater propensities.18
This has a stark impact on outcomes. Indeed, since all voters, both in the majority
and in the minority, equate the marginal benefits of voting with the same cost c, elections
are likely to be ‘toss-up’ elections, in which alternatives are equally likely to be selected. In
terms of welfare, information induces minority voters to participate excessively. This has two
negative effects. First, participation costs are disbursed. Second, the alternative preferred
18When costs are sufficiently low, the incentives to vote increase, and minority voters ultimately vote with
certainty. This is the case corresponding to c ≤ ccrit(p). Note that Goeree and Großer (2007) cover only the
case c ≥ ccrit(p).
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by the majority is less likely to be selected. In other words, welfare decreases when more
information is dispelled in the population.19
The resulting unique quasi-symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium probabilities for par-
ticipation for majority and minority voters (say, for b- and r-individuals when B is the
underlying state) are reported in the right panel of Table 2. We also report the resulting
expected collective costs and expected welfare for the group.
3.3. Lab Polls. Our Lab Polls treatment does not mimic any theoretical environment
that we are aware of. Unlike most theoretical models studying polls (see, e.g., Coughlan, 2000
or Goeree and Großer, 2007), in this treatment we do not restrict subjects to comply with the
behavior announced at the polling stage. We avoid such restrictions in order to emulate ‘real-
world’ polling instruments. In fact, one of our goals is to inspect subjects’ (unconstrained)
reports in the polling stage. This creates a relatively complicated environment, in which
voters may choose to be either truthful or strategic in the polling stage of the game. In
addition, they can consequently decide to follow their intentions or adjust their behavior
after poll results are revealed.20
Certainly, this environment admits a babbling equilibrium, in which agents do not con-
dition their reports at the polling stage on their preferences and follow the equilibrium of
the No Polls treatment at the voting stage.
Other than this equilibrium, a natural class of equilibria to consider is that in which
agents do not mix at the polling stage (but potentially mix at the voting stage). If we
impose symmetry (so that b- and r-individuals behave in a symmetric fashion — reporting
either abstention, the alternative they prefer, or the alternative they do not support in the
19All of these qualitative results would follow through if participation costs were randomly determined,
as long as the distributions from which costs were drawn did not depend on the alternative preferred by an
agent.
20Notice that this game involves, in principle, rather intricate considerations. Reactions to polls may
depend on the precise distribution of reports for both alternatives and for abstention. In that sense, an
agent may always be effectively pivotal in the polling stage, her reports may always affect the distribution
of ultimate outcomes.
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polling stage), the analysis simplifies substantially. Indeed, all agents abstaining constitutes
part of a babbling equilibrium. Otherwise, without loss of generality, assume that agents
report truthfully their preferences at the polling stage.21 In that case, polls reveal the
realized distribution of preferences. The voting stage is then tantamount to a Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983) setting. In particular, behavior at the voting stage must coincide with an
equilibrium of the corresponding Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) game. In our setting, we use
numerical calculations to show that truthful reporting in the polling stage is never part of
an equilibrium.22 In other words, the babbling equilibrium is the only equilibrium that does
not involve mixing at the polling stage.
Intuitively, when the realized distribution is known, the greater the number of supporters
of one alternative, the lower the probability of participation by supporters of that alternative.
Therefore, lying at the polling stage serves to lower participation rates by the supporters of
the alternative the subject prefers less and can therefore be beneficial.
The analysis of the entire set of equilibria that allow for mixing at the polling stage is
beyond the scope of this paper.23 Nonetheless, we return to some indicators of the extent
to which subjects are best responding in our data when we discuss the results from the Lab
Polls treatment.
4. Election Ousctcomes
We start by describing the aggregate outcomes in our elections. We first discuss the distri-
bution of votes allocated to each candidate and, in particular, the prevalence of very close
21If all agents mis-report their preferences at the polling stage, the same information is transmitted in the
group up to a re-labelling of the alternatives.
22We calculated the equilibria corresponding to all distributions of preferences in our setting in the induced
(second-stage) voting games. For certain distributions, there are multiple equilibria. Therefore, we considered
all selections (mappings from realized distributions to a particular equilibrium in the induced game at the
voting stage) and reactions to polls containing an abstention. We then calculated the incentives to deviate
from reporting truthfully at the polling stage and following the corresponding equilibria prescriptions at the
voting stage.
23The number of pure actions, even imposing symmetry, is vast. For any action choices at the polling
stage, we need to specify the participation decisions for any possible realization of poll reports.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distributions of Vote Lead by Winners
elections as a function of the information available. We then consider the welfare conse-
quences of the electorate having access to information via polls.24
4.1. The Emergence of Toss-up Elections. Figure 1 depicts the cumulative distri-
bution of vote leads generated by winners. The left panel corresponds to periods in which
participation costs were set at 25 cents, while the right panel corresponds to periods in which
participation costs were set at 50 cents.25
While election outcomes across the two costs do not differ significantly, outcomes across
treatments differ noticeably. Toss-up elections (in which alternatives either tied or differed
by one vote) occurred significantly more frequently in the No Polls treatment than in either
of the two treatments in which information regarding the distribution of preferences was
revealed.26 In fact, the No Polls treatment produces cumulative distributions that are first
24We note that there were no persistent biases toward the blue or red alternatives: behavior was not
significantly different across the labels of the alternatives.
25In this section, each observation encapsulates one group’s outcome in a period. We return to additional
tests validating this approach in Section 5.3.
26Statistically, we use a probit regression to explain whether an election culminated in a toss-up outcome
with dummy variables for treatments, while clustering observations by groups. For either cost, when the Toss-
up dummy is regressed on the Perfect Polls dummy (or Lab Polls dummy), leaving the No Polls treatment as
the baseline, we obtain a negative coefficient for the corresponding Polls dummy that is significant at the 5%
level. When the Toss-up dummy is regressed on the Lab Polls dummy leaving the Perfect Polls treatment
as the base group, we obtain a coefficient that is not significantly different from zero.
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order stochastically dominated by those generated by the other two treatments. Using
regression analysis, we find that these differences are indeed significant for both costs.27 In
particular, landslide elections appear more frequently when information regarding preferences
is available.28
We also note that the Perfect Polls and Lab Polls treatments generated very similar
distributions of ultimate vote leads that are not significantly different from one another.29
We return to a discussion of this similarity in Sections 5.2 and 6.
4.2. Welfare. We now turn to the performance of elections with and without polls in
terms of overall welfare and likelihood to select the majority-preferred alternative.
In terms of choosing the collectively optimal alternative, that favored by a majority, polls
appear to have a positive effect. As the top panel of Table 3 suggests, especially for lower
participation costs, the availability of Perfect or Lab polls assists somewhat in achieving the
alternative favored by the majority. These differences are more pronounced when the group
is closely divided (corresponding to type differences of 1 or 3). Participation costs are not
significantly different across treatments as the second panel in Table 3 illustrates. In fact, in
utility terms, group utilitiarian welfare (accounting for payoffs from the selected alternative
and the participation costs), is not significantly different across treatments.30
27For each cost and for each value of vote difference between the winning and losing group denoted by k,
we create a variable that takes the value 1 if the vote difference in the election is k or less and the value 0
otherwise. We then run a probit regression of this binary variable on the dummy for the Perfect Polls (Lab
Polls) treatment leaving No Polls treatment as the baseline, and clustering observations by groups. Almost
all coefficients are negative and significant at the 5% level except for the following ones. When comparing
the No Polls and Perfect Polls treatments, the only coefficient that is not statistically significant is the
one corresponding to the equal number of votes for each color when voting costs are 50. When comparing
the No Polls and Lab Polls treatments, the coefficients that are not statistically significant are the ones
corresponding to the equal number of votes for each color for both costs, and the one for a vote difference of
4 and below for the voting cost of 50.
28In our data, unanimous or almost-unanimous elections involving all participants never occurred.
29To compare the distributions of vote lead by the winner between Perfect Polls and Lab Polls we used
the same technique as for the comparison of the No Polls and Perfect Polls (Lab Polls) treatments described
above.
30Welfare is not significantly different across treatments according to any standard parameteric or non-
parametric test clustering by groups.
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Table 3: Aggregate Election Outcomes
This result contrasts some of the basic insights from the theoretical work on polls that
suggests the negative effects of polls (due to the increased propensity of the ‘wrong’ minority
group to participate, which we inspect below). We stress that had subjects used equilibrium
strategies, with our volume of data, the ranking of welfare across treatments would likely
correspond to the theoretical predictions and be statistically different.31
Though differences are not significant, we note that the welfare values observed do follow
the theoretical comparative statics with respect to costs, generating greater mean observed
welfare levels when participation costs are lower.
5. Voting Behavior
In this section we consider the voting patterns observed in our data. We first describe the
overall voting propensities of majorities and minorities across sessions. We then consider
31For instance, for participation costs of 50, simulating our experiment assuming that subjects use equilib-
rium strategies (with the number of subjects participating in our experiments) for 1, 000, 000 iterations leads
to a likelihood exceeding 95% of group welfare without polls surpassing that with perfect polls. Performing
the same simulations using subjects’ experimental participation rates leads to a likelihood of less than 10%
of group welfare without polls surpassing that with perfect polls. In particular, this suggests that it is not
the particular experimental realizations of preferences that are driving our results.
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Table 4: Observed Participation Propensities
information and consequent beliefs as channels explaining behavior.
5.1. Turnout. Table 4 contains the observed voting propensities as a function of whether
an individual is part of the expected minority or majority, when such indication exists (all
standard errors appearing in parentheses). The comparative statics with respect to costs
hold across conditions: higher costs generating lower participation. However, in both our
Perfect Polls and Lab Polls treatments, minorities participate less than majorities (differ-
ences significant at any reasonable level).32 Furthermore, the availability of information
reduces the probability of minority participation and increases the probability of majority
participation.
5.2. Response to Information. In order to understand the mechanism generating the
observed participation rates, subjects’ reports regarding their beliefs are particularly useful.
Since behavior across costs appears very similar for all of our treatments, for simplicity, in
the remains of the paper, we present results aggregated across costs.33
In the No Polls treatment, agents’ participation rates do not differ significantly when
elections are predicted to be toss-up elections (i.e., alternatives are tied or their support
differs by one vote) or not close. However, when information is available in the Perfect Polls
and Lab Polls treatments, elections that are perceived to be close generate significantly
32This result is in line with Duffy and Tavits (2008), Groβer and Schram (2010), and Kartal (2012),
who also observe excessive voting by majorities in different environments in which majority membership is
transparent.
33All of the observations hold true when separating treatments by costs. These separate analyses are
available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2: Voting Propensities as a Function of Beliefs
greater participation than others.34 At first blush, these results seem in line with the pivotal
voter model — agents participate at greater frequencies when they perceive themselves as
pivotal. They are consistent with the insights of some of the experimental literature that
inspects the pivotal voter model and considers different likelihoods of close elections (see,
e.g., Duffy and Tavits, 2008 and Levine and Palfrey, 2007).
Our design allows us to unfold the responses to different events corresponding to elections
that are not close — those in which the preferred alternative is predicted to win with a
landslide, and those in which the opposing candidate is predicted to win with a large victory
margin. Figure 2 depicts subjects’ voting propensities as a function of their predictions
regarding the lead of their preferred candidate (where light gray bars correspond to the
frequency of the different guess leads in our data).35
Figure 2 illustrates behavior that is not naturally aligned with the prescriptions of the
34In the Perfect Polls treatment, participation rates were 0.59 and 0.49 when elections were perceived to
be close and not, respectively. The difference between the two rates is significant at the 10% level. In the
Lab Polls treatment, participation rates were 0.62 and 0.42 when elections were perceived to be close and
not, respectively, with differences between the two rates being significant at the 5% level. The statistical
significance is assessed using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test with one observation per subject per category.
35In Figure 2, we report only events that occured at least 10 times over all experimental elections.
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pivotal voter model. While voting propensities are lower when the opposing candidate is
predicted to exhibit a large margin of victory relative to those corresponding to close elec-
tions, the propensities to vote when the preferred alternative is predicted to have a landslide
win do not appear to be very different than those observed when elections are predicted to
be close.36 This is echoed statistically. Across sessions, voting propensities are significantly
lower when the preferred candidate is predicted to have a substantial loss (with the winning
candidate having a lead of at least two votes) relative to the propensities to vote when the
election is predicted to be close.37 These differences are all significant at the 1% level. How-
ever, across treatments, propensities are not significantly different (up to a 9% confidence
level) between predicted close elections and elections in which the preferred alternative is
predicted to win with a landslide.38
These results are mirrored by the response to the polling information in our Lab Polls
treatment. When the poll suggested the preferred alternative would experience a substantial
loss, the voting propensity was 0.29. When the poll suggested a toss-up election, the voting
propensity was 0.60, different than the former rate at the 1% level, but not significantly
different than the rate of 0.49 observed when a landslide victory for the preferred alternative
was suggested by the polls.
One could naturally wonder whether reported beliefs are at all accurate. Indeed, if, say,
agents tended to report exaggerated beliefs regarding the likelihood of their preferred candi-
date winning with a large margin, ultimate behavior could still approximate that prescribed
by the pivotal voter model. Figure 3 depicts the predicted lead as a function of the realized
lead of the preferred alternatives. As can be seen, the No Polls treatment exhibits fairly poor
accuracies of beliefs (with some advantage given to the preferred alternative). This should be
36Field data is consistent with this observation. In the 2000 presidential election, a survey conducted under
the American National Election Studies revealed that of respondents who thought their preferred candidate
would win by a large margin, 65% still went out to vote (authors’ tabulation).
37When the preferred candidate is predicted to lose with a substantial margin, voting propensities are
0.29, 0.26, and 0.22 in the No Polls, Perfect Polls, and Lab Polls treatments, respectively. The corresponding
rates for elections that are predicted to be close are 0.46, 0.59, and 0.62, respectively.
38When the preferred candidate is predicted to win with a substantial margin, voting propensities are
0.52, 0.57, and 0.51 in the No Polls, Perfect Polls, and Lab Polls treatments, respectively.
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Figure 3: Belief Accuracies
expected since subjects do not receive any information that is indicative of the composition
of their group.39 However, subjects are fairly accurate in the Perfect Polls and Lab Polls
treatments, at least for moderate leads (where the majority of our data lays). When actual
leads are extreme, subjects are more conservative in their beliefs, but the linkage between
beliefs and realized leads is symmetric across losses and victories of the preferred alterna-
tives. In particular, distortions in beliefs cannot reconcile in and of themselves the pivotal
voter model with the participation responses to beliefs we observe.
Last, we mention an alternative way by which to consider subjects’ responses to in-
formation. Recall that we elicited subjects’ predictions regarding both the composition of
groups as well as their predictions regarding the realized lead of either alternative. In prin-
ciple, reported predicted leads are expectations derived from some perceived probabilities
of participation by either type of voter. We can then deduce these perceived probabilities
39The fairly consistent predicted lead of one vote for the preferred alternative can be explained as follows.
Each subject’s posterior that the selected jar color matches their preference is 2/3. Therefore, the probability
that any other individual shares their preferences is given by 2/3 ∗ 2/3 + 1/3 ∗ 1/3 = 5/9. In particular, the
expected number of individuals preferring the alternative the subject prefers is 1 + 5/9 ∗ 8 = 5.44, while the
expeced number of subjects preferring the other alternative is 4/9 ∗ 8 = 3.55. Recall that individual turnout
rates were between 43% and 55% (depending on costs). These would translate into an expected lead of
approximately one vote for the preferred alternative.
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and calculate the induced probability of being pivotal for each individual. Response to in-
formation can then be seen through the propensity to vote as a function of these induced
probabilities of being pivotal. Such a calculation generates very similar insights to the ones
described above. While a high probability of pivotality is associated with greater turnout
than a slightly lower probability of pivotality, the association is in no way monotonic glob-
ally. In fact, the highest turnout rates correspond to moderate induced probabilities of being
pivotal.40
5.3. Individual Regression Analysis. We use regression analysis to investigate indi-
vidual behavior. While the previous section illustrated the link between participation and
beliefs, we are interested in the relative effects of other factors. In particular, we want to
inspect whether behavior in specific groups evolved in different ways throughout the exper-
iment.
For each treatment, we run a probit regression predicting the dependence of participation
decisions on various explanatory variables, clustering standard errors by individuals. Table
5 contains our estimations.
We first note that there are no group-specific effects in any of the three treatments.41
Second, there are no time effects, suggesting that behavior in our experiments exhibited very
little learning.42
The regression analysis provides us with another opportunity to closely examine several
predictions of the pivotal voter model. Among other things, this model suggests that an
individual is more likely to participate when the voting costs are low, the composition lead
of the preferred alternative is small, the lead of the majority group is small if the voter is a
member of the majority group, or when the lead of the majority group is small when the
40For instance, in the Lab Polls treatment, turnout is 25% when the induced probability of being pivotal
is between 0.95 and 1, while it is 56% when the induced probability of being pivotal is between 0.25 and
0.35.
41In all treatments, all dummy variables that indicate a particular group of subjects are not significantly
different from zero with p-values above 10%.
42This provides justification for the way we report our results throughout the paper, pooling observations
from all periods of the experiment.
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Table 5: Probit Regressions Explaining Turnout (Marginal Effects Reported)
voter is a member of the minority group. Indeed, the latter three types of events correspond
to a greater probability that an individual vote would be pivotal in the election. Our data
suggests that most but not all of these predictions hold true. In all three treatments, higher
voting costs decrease the probability to participate and a greater lead of the alternative
preferred by the majority decreases the probability of the minority members to participate.
Moreover, in both treatments with polls, the propensity to vote declines with the composition
lead of the preferred alternative. However, as illustrated in the previous section and contrary
to the predictions of the pivotal voter model, in both poll treatments the lead of the majority
group has a positive and significant effect on participation by majority group members.
Finally, in all treatments subjects are more likely to vote in the current election if they did
so in the previous election and their preferred alternative won. This effect is reminiscent of
reinforcement learning models, according to which people are more likely to choose strategies
that achieved good results in the past rounds of the play (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998
and references therein).
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6. Poll Reports
Our Lab Polls treatment allows us to gain insight into how individuals respond to polls.
In principle, since we see that poll results affect behavior and outcomes, individuals could
potentially gain by mis-reporting their intended actions in the polling phase.
First, pre-election polls consistently overestimate voter turnout: while 82% of subjects
reported they will vote, less than 50% actually did vote. This result mirrors the trend
documented in the empirical literature that estimates turnout based on self reports in the
American National Election Study (see Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010 and references therein).
On the individual level, of those reporting they will vote, 42% of subjects voted. Nonethe-
less, subjects rarely voted for an alternative different than the one they declared they would
vote for: of the subjects intending to vote, only 6% cast a vote for an alternative different
than the one they chose in the poll.
In terms of incentives, individuals reporting a vote for their preferred candidate earned,
on average, $1.15 per election, individuals reporting a vote for their less preferred candidate
earned an average of $0.98, while individuals reporting abstention earned an average of $1.13
(with standard errors of 3c/, 10c/, and 7c/, respectively). That is, experimental incentives
were such that reporting the genuinely preferred candidate or intended abstention generated
greater payoffs.43 This is interesting in view of the theoretical predictions pertaining to
the Lab Polls treatment. Indeed, subjects in our experiments did not follow the babbling
equilibrium. Furthermore, a substantial fraction did not best respond at the polling stage.
Nonetheless, a simple behavioral heuristic is consistent with some of our data. Suppose
each subject assumes that all others follow their intended actions as declared in the poll. A
subject would then vote only when pivotal according to the poll. Given our experimental
poll results, such behavior would lead to a participation rate of 57%, which is fairly close to
what we observed in the lab.
Overall, polls seemed to reflect the ultimate election outcomes. Of the elections that did
43Note that since subjects respond to the magnitude of the lead in the polls, individuals are ‘pivotal’ for
any profile of others’ reports in the poll.
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not end up in a tie, 84% of the outcomes coincided with those predicted by the polls.
In terms of outcomes, the literature on the effects of polls has identified two effects.
The Bandwagon Effect suggests that the predicted winner in a poll gains additional support
after the poll’s publication. The Underdog Effect suggests that the predicted loser gains
additional support after the poll’s publication. Indeed, Bandwagon and Underdog Effects
have been extensively studied in the recent few decades starting with the pioneering work
of Simon (1954), Fleitas (1971), and Gartner (1976), among others (see Callander, 2007 and
references therein for recent theoretical work on these phenomena). While most work is in
consensus regarding the existence of these two effects, the debate about their magnitudes
still goes on. Irwin and Van Holsteyn (2000) conduct a meta-study of the empirical research
on the two effects. The authors conclude that starting from the 1980s, a Bandwagon Effect
was more frequent than an Underdog Effect.
Figure 4 depicts the realized lead as a function of the lead predicted by the polls. As
can be seen, for moderate predicted leads, realized leads surpass those suggested by the poll,
thereby confirming to a Bandwagon Effect. Nonetheless, when predicted leads are extreme
(greater than 3), realized leads are more conservative, supporting an Underdog Effect. In
other words, both effects gain support in our data, but which one prevails depends on whether
or not the poll ends up in a close or landslide outcome. Furthermore, the magnitude of the
effects depends on the precise poll outcomes. In particular, the underdog effect appears more
pronounced as poll leads become substantial.
One potential explanation for these observations is the following. Low poll leads are
more likely to arise when there are relatively many individuals reporting abstention at the
polling stage. In our data, 50% of those intending to abstain ultimately participated. Since
participation is more likely when one’s preferred alternative is leading in the polls, those
reporting abstention at the polls serve to magnify the lead observed at the polling stage.
Consequently, the difference between the actual lead and the poll lead of the winner is
expected to increase with the number of those abstaining at the polls, consistent with the
Bandwagon Effect we observe for low poll leads. For high poll leads, recall that 6% of our
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subjects voted for an alternative different than the one they chose in the poll. As it turns
out, most of these subjects belonged to the minority group, and therefore contributed to an
exaggerated poll lead. When poll leads are high, fewer individuals abstain and this pattern
of behavior has more impact. This generates the observed Underdog Effect.
7. Concluscsions
We provide an array of experiments that closely inspect voters’ turnout response to beliefs
regarding ultimate outcomes and the consequent effects of information about the electorate’s
underlying preferences, specifically in the form of polls. The first message that emerges
from our analysis is that, contrary to the underlying premise of the pivotal voter model,
the propensity to vote increases with subjects’ predictions of their preferred alternative’s
advantage. This is the case despite our setting being, in many ways, conducive for the
strategic considerations posited by the pivotal voter model to play out: our experimental
groups are arguably small so that pivot probabilities are substantial and many external
motives that may be important in large political elections (peer pressure to vote, changing
knowledge about candidates, etc.) are controlled for. The monotonic response to beliefs
about one’s preferred alternative’s likelihood of winning leads to the second message of
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the paper: pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental effects on welfare that the
extant theoretical work on the effects of polls predicts. In fact, pre-election polls lead to
more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections. Finally,
our study provides insights on the behavior of individuals in polls and the responses they
generate. We find that individuals report participation intentions that exceed the ultimate
participation rates, but rarely mis-report which candidate they would support if intending
to vote. This feeds into the impact of polls on outcomes. Close elections are more prone
to Bandwagon Effects, by which poll winners gain even greater leads in the actual election,
while landslide elections are more prone to Underdog Effects, where poll winners gain lower
leads in the actual election.
The analysis opens the door to several directions for future research. It suggests the
usefulness of considering alternative theoretical constructs to that suggested by the canonical
pivotal voter model. For instance, incorporating a desire to vote for winners, as suggested in
Callander (2007), could generate predictions in line with our results. Furthermore, anecdotal
election data suggest that such a desire may play an important role. For example, the TGI
Brasil study of 2003 interviewed 8, 907 individuals between the ages of 20 and 64. Of those,
13% agreed with the statement “I always vote for the probable winner in an election.”44 In
addition, our results suggest the need for more elaborate studies of polling behavior. Indeed,
in our experiments, behavior in the election did not mimic poll reports. Therefore, the
common assumption regarding truthful poll reports may need to be relaxed when considering
different policies having to do with the regulation of polls.
Last, our analysis raises questions regarding the value of polls. In our experiments, when
observing the ex-ante majority-preferred alternative (namely, the color of the realized jar),
the probability of that alternative being elected is 74% when no polls are available, 91%
when perfect polls are available, and 83% when endogenous polls are utilized. This suggests
the potential value of polls to well-informed candidates.
44See also Feddersen, Gailmard, and Sandroni (2009) for another class of voting models in which agents
do not decide on their participation solely based on pivot probabilities.
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